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Taxation, Equal Protection, and Inquiry into the 
Purpose of a Law: Nordlinger v. Hahn and 
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County 
Commission 
In 1978, California taxpayers passed Proposition 13, which 
overhauled the state's property tax laws, saved taxpayers seven 
billion dollars in tax assessments during the first year alone,' 
and required wide-scale fiscal restructuring of the state govern- 
ment.2 Aside from dramatically lowering tax rates, Proposition 
13 redefined the tax base by capping the assessed value of 
property at its acquisition value, with only minor adjustments 
thereafter.3 
Because of California's highly inflationary real property 
market during the 1970s and 19808, the assessed values of 
comparable properties quickly drifted apart. In California, the 
1. REPOF~T OF THE SEN. COMM'N ON PROPERTY TAX EQUITY AND REVENUE TO 
THE CAL. STATE SEN. 28 (1991). 
2. Proposition 13 amended Article XI11 of the California Constitution to read 
as follows (in relevant part): 
5 1. Maximum amount of ad valorem tax 
(a) The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real property 
shall not exceed One percent (1%) of the full cash value of such 
property. 
5 2. Assessment of full cash value; Definitions 
(a) The full cash value means the county assessor's valuation of 
real property as shown on the 1975-76 tax bill under "full cash 
valuen or, thereafter, the appraised value of real property when 
purchased, newly constructed, or a change in ownership has oc- 
curred after the 1975 assessment. All real property not already 
assessed up to the 1975-76 full cash value may be reassessed to 
reflect that valuation. 
CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA. 
Proposition 13 provided for two major exceptions to the reassessment plan. 
First, transfers of property from parents to their children did not merit a reassess- 
ment. Id. § 2(h). Second, homeowners over the age of 55 who sold their principal 
place of residence could purchase another residence of lesser or equal value and 
retain their original assessment value. Id. 5 2(a). 
3. This assessment provision was not applied retroactively; instead, proper- 
ties already owned by a taxpayer were valued a t  their 1975-76 level. Id. $ 2(a). 
This valuation method avoided huge disparities in the assessed values of compara- 
ble properties at  the outset. 
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typical recent home buyer faces a much higher property tax 
than a neighbor who purchased a similar home years before a t  
a lower price.4 Proposition 13 provided no mechanism by which 
such disparate tax burdens would converge; in fact, it limited 
the annual increase in assessed values to only two p e r ~ e n t . ~  
The constitutionality of such unequal treatment of similarly 
situated tax payers was attacked the same year Proposition 13 
was enacted. However, employing traditional Equal Protection 
Clause principles, the California Supreme Court held that 
unequal taxation of similar properties did not violate the Four- 
teenth Amendment if the taxation scheme rationally furthered 
a legitimate government i n t e r e ~ t . ~  
The California court's 1978 decision was not surprising 
given the deference the United States Supreme Court tradi- 
tionally affords the states in creating their own taxation proce- 
dures.' However, in 1989, the United States Supreme Court in 
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. u. County Commission8 inval- 
idated a tax assessment scheme using rational basis scruti- 
ny-something it had not done since 1933.' According to the 
unanimous opinion, when assessment strategies undergo con- 
stitutional review, the Equal Protection Clause requires the 
"seasonable attainment of a rough equality in tax treatment of 
similarly situated property o~ne r s . " '~  Since California's tax 
- 
4. A Los Angeles County study that compared the prices of homes purchased 
in August 1989 with the assessed values of the previous owners revealed dispari- 
ties as high as 17:l in certain neighborhoods. Several neighborhoods had disparities 
ranging from 13:l to 9:l. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at  Al, Nordlinger v. 
Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992) (No. 90-1912). 
5. CAL. CONST. art. XIHA, 9 2@). 
6. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 
583 P.2d 1281, 1292-94 (Cal. 1978), overruled on other grounds by Los Angeles 
County Tramp. Comm'n v. Richmond, 643 P.2d 941 (Cal. 1982). For another case 
attacking Proposition 13, see R.H. Macy & Co. v. Contra Costa County, 276 Cal. 
Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 943 (Cal. Feb. 28, 
1991), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2256, and cert. dismissed, 111 S. Ct. 2923 (1991). 
7. See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 US. 356, 359 (1973) 
("States have large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which in 
their judgement produce reasonable systems of taxation."); Allied Stores, Inc. v. 
Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526 (1959) ("States have a very wide discretion in the lay- 
ing of their taxes."); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (stating that 
state tax schemes have a strong presumption of constitutionality). 
8. 488 U.S. 336 (1989). 
9. Robert J. G l e ~ o n ,  Taxation and Equal Protection, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
261, 262 (1990). The 1933 case was Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 
(1933). 
10. 488 US. at 343. 
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scheme resulted in highly disparate treatment," it appeared 
that Proposition 13 would no longer pass constitutional mus- 
ter. l2 
California's worries were quelled in June 1992 when the 
United States Supreme Court held that the State's property 
taxing scheme was constitutional. In Nordlinger v. Hahn,13 
the Court returned to a deferential treatment of state taxation 
schemes after its singular deviation in Allegheny Pittsburgh. 
Unfortunately, one state's victory "left . . . Equal Protection 
jurisprudence in disarraY"l4 because the Court reached its de- 
cision without overruling Allegheny ~ittsburgh;" rather, the 
Court labelled Allegheny Pittsburgh as a "rare case" in which 
rational basis scrutiny was not met? The distinctions drawn 
between the two cases are troublesome. 
This Note focuses on the differences in the legal reasoning 
employed in Nordlinger and Allegheny Pittsburgh in an effort 
to discern why the Court found that such similar taxing meth- 
ods merited opposite constitutional results. Part I1 gives a brief 
background of the Equal Protection Clause and taxation, focus- 
ing on the anomalous Allegheny Pittsburgh decision. The facts 
and opinion of the recent Nordlinger decision are outlined in 
part 111. Part IV argues that the Nordlinger Court's upholding 
of Proposition 13 comports with traditional rational basis scru- 
tiny of taxation matters, but that the majority's assertion that 
Allegheny Pittsburgh and Nordlinger can be reconciled is prob- 
lematic. The analysis shows that the Court has not firmly de- 
cided how to  discern the purpose of a given taxing scheme. In 
Part V, this Note concludes that the analysis underlying Alle- 
gheny Pittsburgh should be discarded, and that courts should 
continue to afford great latitude to state taxation schemes if 
11. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
12. Finding Proposition 13 unconstitutional could have been devastating to 
the already financially strapped state. If property taxes were rolled back to the 
1975 levels, the state could have suffered as much as $10 billion per year in lost 
revenue while being wholly understaffed to perform the assessments required to 
implement market-value taxation. Brief of Amicus Curiae Cal. Assessors' Ass'n in 
Support of Neither Party at  5-6, Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992) (No. 
90-1912). 
13. 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992). Justice Blackmun wrote for the seven-justice ma- 
jority. Justice Thomas concurred in the result but disagreed with the Court's inter- 
pretation of, and failure to reverse, Allegheny Pittsburgh. Justice Stevens dissented. 
14. Id. at  2341 (Thomas, J., concurring in part). 
15. Id. at  2334. 
16. Id. at  2335. 
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the schemes are rationally related to any plausible and legiti- 
mate government purpose. l7 
11. BACKGROUND: THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
AND TAXATION 
The Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted to de- 
mand that "all persons similarly circumstanced . . . be treated 
alike."18 Nevertheless, to effect their legitimate ends, govern- 
ments are permitted to define what constitutes similarly situat- 
ed persons and to make appropriate classifications. These clas- 
sifications are subject to varying degrees of scrutiny; those 
affecting fundamental rights are subject to the strictest scruti- 
ny, while those based on social and economic needs are re- 
viewed under a more deferential rational basis test.lg Because 
they involve economic policy, taxing strategies devised by a 
state legislature or a state agent are traditionally afforded a 
great deal of deferen~e.~' 
The Court's deviation in Allegheny Pittsburgh from its 
usual course was surprising, especially since no property tax 
scheme had been held to violate the Equal Protection Clause 
since 1931 and no taxation scheme had failed rational basis 
scrutiny since 1933 .~~ In Allegheny Pittsburgh, the Webster 
County assessor valued properties according to the price a t  
which they were purchased. Since subsequent modifications in  
assessed value were too small and too infrequent to keep up 
with rising real estate "gross disparities in the 
17. The author has limited this Note to a discussion of rational basis scru- 
tiny. The Court found neither the tax scheme in Allegheny Pittsburgh nor that in 
Nordinger worthy of heightened scrutiny. This Note does not delve into the policy 
aspects of market-value versus acquisition-value taxation. 
18. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. 
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). For an excellent discussion on the E ~ u a l  
Protection Clause, see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 
439-42 (1985). 
19. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at  439. 
20. See cases cited supra note 7. 
21. See William Cohen, State Law in Equality Clothing: A Comment on Alle- 
gheny Pittsburgh Coal Company u. County Commission, 38 UCLA L. REV. 87, 91 
n.25 (1990). The cases were Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of Revision of Tax As- 
sessments, 284 U.S. 23 (1931), and Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 
(1933). Cumberland was a case somewhat similar to Allegheny Pittsburgh in that i t  
involved disparate assessments of coal-bearing properties, and the assessment 
scheme was contrary to state law. 
22. On three separate occasions (in 1976, 1981, and 1983), a 10% adjustment 
was made to certain properties that had not 'been recently sold. Even these 
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assessed value of generally comparable property"23 resulted. 
The assessor's taxing procedures were utilized despite a provi- 
sion in the West Virginia Constitution that required "all prop- 
erty, both real and personal, [to] be taxed in proportion to its 
Though the effects of Webster County's assessment meth- 
ods paralleled those of Proposition 13, the purpose behind the 
two schemes (as perceived by the Court) differed. In  Allegheny 
Pittsburgh, Webster County argued that its assessment strate- 
gy was rationally related to its purpose of achieving current- 
market-value taxation.25 Chief Justice Rehnquist would have 
found this assertion reasonable "[als long as general adjust- 
ments [were] accurate enough over a short period of time to 
equalize the differences in proportion between the assessments 
of a class of property holders."26 In such circumstances, the 
Equal Protection Clause would be fully satisfied even though 
properties were reassessed infrequently. While granting leeway 
to state actors to craft their own means of taxation, the Court 
pinned them down to rigid ends, stating that "[in] each case, 
the constitutional requirement is the seasonable attainment of 
a rough equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property 
o ~ n e r s . " ~  Given the vast tax disparities of like properties in 
Webster County, the Court had little difficulty in finding that 
the assessor's practices failed to meet this requirement. 
Despite the Court's traditional deference in taxation mat- 
ters, the county assessor's scheme failed rational basis scrutiny 
because the classification of property owners by time of pur- 
chase did not "rest upon some reasonable consideration of dif- 
ference or po l i~y . "~  The Court then resurrected verbiage from 
a 1918 decision, stating that "[ilntentional systematic underval- 
uation by state officials of other taxable property in  the same 
class contravenes the constitutional right of one taxed upon the 
f d  value of his property."29 
seemingly sizeable increases failed to keep up with the inflationary market in the 
region. Allegheny Pittsburgh, 488 U.S. at 338-39. 
23. Id. at 338. 
24. W. VA. CONST. art. X, 8 1. 
25. Allegheny Pittsburgh, 488 U.S. at 343. 
26. Id. (citing Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1959)). 
27. Id. (emphasis added). 
28. Id. at 344 (quoting Brown-Forman Co. v.  ent tuck^; 217 U.S. 563, 573 
(1910)). 
29. Id. at 345 (quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 
352-353 (1918)). 
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Just  in case the California legal community had failed to 
ponder whether the Court would head west to ravage Proposi- 
tion 13, the Court tempted the state's imagination in a foot- 
note: 
We need not and do not decide today whether the Webster 
County assessment method would stand on a different footing 
if it  were the law of a State, generally applied, instead of the 
aberrational enforcement policy it appears to be. The State of 
California has adopted a similar policy as Article XIIIA of its 
Constitution, popularly known as  "Proposition 13."~' 
This language sounded like a formal invitation to California 
taxpayers to test the validity of Proposition 13. Such a taxpayer 
presented herself soon after Allegheny Pittsburgh was pub- 
lished. 
Petitioner Stephanie Nordlinger had recently purchased a 
modest home in Los Angeles County only to find she was pay- 
ing nearly five times the property taxes of some of her long- 
established neighbors who lived in similar homes.31 After the 
Los Angeles Superior Court dismissed her claims for a tax 
refund and for a declaration that Proposition 13 was unconsti- 
tutional, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal 
based on traditional notions of deference to state tax laws hav- 
ing a rational basis.32 According to the Court of Appeal, Alle- 
gheny Pittsburgh did not invalidate acquisition-value tax 
schemes, but rather "arbitrary enforcement" of market-value 
taxation s t r a t e g i e ~ . ~ ~  The California Supreme Court denied 
review and the United States Supreme Court granted certior- 
ari. 
The majority in Nordlinger did very little to distinguish the 
practical effects of Proposition 13 from those produced by the 
Webster County scheme. Justice Blackmun began his opinion 
by noting how "staggering" the differences in assessed values of 
30. Id. at 344 n.4. 
31. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 3, Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 
(1992) (NO. 90-1912). 
32. Nordlinger v. Lynch, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684 (Ct. App. 1990). 
33. Id. at 686. 
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comparable properties had become;34 moreover, he noted that  
such assessments were likely to diverge further over time.35 
In order to determine whether such unequal treatment was 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause, this standard was set 
forth: 
[Tlhe Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a 
plausible policy reason for the classification, the legislative 
facts on which the classification is apparently based rational- 
ly may have been considered to be true by the governmental 
decisionmaker, and the relationship of the classification to its 
goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary 
or irrational. This standard i s  especially deferential in the 
context of classifications made by complex tax laws.36 
Justice Blackmun presented two possible purposes for 
Proposition 13's unequal treatment of taxpayers. First, since 
moving from one home to another would likely increase a n  
owner's property taxes, the acquisition-value tax system dis- 
courages rapid turnover of properties and preserves the integ- 
rity of neighborhoods. Second, the classification is rational 
because new home buyers and established residents have en- 
tirely different reliance interests. The person buying a new 
home can look a t  the property tax burden with open eyes and a 
keen understanding of the real property market. The estab- 
lished resident, on the other hand, has "vested expectations" in  
her property that are worthy of more protection than the "an- 
ticipatory expectations" of a new neighb~r.~'  Her decision to 
buy cannot be avoided. Hence, the acquisition-value tax scheme 
prevents the elderly and those on a tight budget from being 
taxed out of their homes due to unrealized paper gains on their 
real property. 
Having easily found a plausible purpose for Proposition 13, 
and thus having met traditional rational basis scrutiny, the 
Court confronted the more difficult task of distinguishing the 
Allegheny Pittsburgh decision. The Court performed this task 
all too simply by noting that "an obvious and critical factual 
34. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2329; see supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
35. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2329. The petitioner's suggestion that unequal 
taxation for similarly situated owners might merit heightened scrutiny-because it 
infringes one's hndamental right to travel-was dismissed summarily for lack of 
standing. Id. at 2332. 
36. Id. (citations omitted). 
37. Id. at 2333. 
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difference between this case and Allegheny Pittsburgh is the 
absence of any indication in Allegheny Pittsburgh that the poli- 
cies underlying an acquisition-value taxation scheme could 
conceivably have been the purpose for the Webster County tax 
assessor's unequal assessment ~cheme."~' In essence, 
Nordlinger stated that the Equal Protection Clause was violat- 
ed in Allegheny Pittsburgh because the county stated one pur- 
pose and then acted in a way not rationally related to that 
purpose. The Court confidently wrapped up its review of Alle- 
gheny Pittsburgh as follows: 
[It] was the rare case where the facts precluded any plausible 
inference that the reason for the unequal assessment practice 
was to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value tax 
scheme. By contrast, Article XIIIA was enacted precisely to 
achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value system. Allegheny 
Pittsburgh is not controlling here.3g 
The asserted purpose of the two schemes, rather than their 
substance or implementation, was the critical difference. Thus, 
the Court appears to say that virtually identical plans can have 
differing constitutional results if they have different stated 
goals. 
IV. NORDLINGER AND ALLEGHENY PITTSBURGH CANNOT BE 
RECONCILED 
The Nordlinger decision is questionable in at least two 
ways. First, it denied the effect of the distinction alluded to in 
Allegheny Pittsburgh between codified state taxing schemes 
and those which are merely the practice of state agents. Sec- 
ond, the Court inconsistently applied rational basis scrutiny, 
demanding that a classification be rationally related to  an 
articulated purpose in Allegheny Pittsburgh, but using a looser 
standard for discerning purpose in Nordlinger. 
A. Is a Codified Scheme Inherently More Constitutional 
than an Aberrant Administrative Practice? 
The Nordlinger Court suggested that "the protections of 
the Equal Protection Clause are [not] any less when the classi- 
fication is drawn by legislative mandate . . . than by adminis- 
38. Id. at 2334. 
39. Id. at 2335 (footnote omitted). 
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trative action as in Allegheny P i t t s b ~ r g h . " ~ ~  The Court further 
c l d i e d  that its holding does not "suggest that the Equal Pro- 
tection Clause constrains administrators, as in Allegheny Pitts- 
burgh, from violating state law requiring uniformity of taxation 
of property.'"' However, the conflicting results in Nordlinger 
and Allegheny Pittsburgh may suggest otherwise. 
The Court is justifiably uneasy about lending credence to a 
constitutional distinction between codified schemes and aber- 
rant administrative practices. The Equal Protection Clause has 
never been an adequate tool by which the Court can police 
state administrators. A state agent's misapplication of state 
law does not trigger, by itself, an Equal Protection Clause vio- 
l a t i ~ n . ~ ~  Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court must 
accept the state high court's construction of its own constitu- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  Since the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
found that the actions of the Webster County assessor did not 
violate the state's con~titution,4~ the Webster County tax 
scheme could not be construed as a misapplication of state law. 
While the Nordlinger Court correctly stated the law, its 
reasoning about the non-effect of codification is troublesome. 
Only three years earlier in Allegheny Pittsburgh, the unani- 
mous Court seemed particularly bothered that the assessments 
in Webster County were imposed differently than in other parts 
of the state. The Court remarked, 'We are not advised of any 
West Virginia statute or practice which authorizes individual 
counties of the State to fashion their own substantive assess- 
ment policies independently of state ~tatute. '"~ One must 
question why the taxing scheme was labelled an "aberrational 
enforcement policy" if the Court were not comparing it to some- 
thing it deemed normal-namely the method approved by the 
state constitution. The Allegheny Pittsburgh decision was 
40. Id. at 2335 n.8. 
41. Id.; see id. at 2343 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ('Webster County's scheme 
was constitutionally invalid not because i t  was a departure from state law, but be- 
cause i t  involved the relative 'systematic undervaluation . . . [of] property in the 
same class.' ") (quoting Allegheny Pittsburgh, 488 U.S. a t  345). 
42. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 US. 1, 7 (1944). 
43. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 376 n.7 (1979); Ward v. 
Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 772 (1977); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 426 
U.S. 668, 674 n.9 (1976). 
44. In re 1975 Tax Assessments Against Oneida Coal Co., 360 S.E.2d 560, 
564 (W. Va. 1987), rev'd sub nom. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County 
Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989). 
45. Allegheny Pittsburgh, 488 U.S. a t  345. 
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arguably influenced by the Court's skeptical view of atypical 
assessment policies.46 
B. Actual Purpose or Any Plausible Purpose: What Does 
the Equal Protection Clause Require? 
Whether or not one assumes the Court viewed Allegheny 
Pittsburgh's "aberrational" scheme with such disregard as to 
skew the outcome of the case, the Court's inflexible determi- 
nation of the purpose of the county's taxing practice most likely 
forced the strange outcome in that case. If the Equal Protection 
Clause demands that a discriminatory classification be ratio- 
nally related to a legitimate state purpose, an  inquiry into the 
purpose of an administrative practice or legislative act cannot 
be avoided unless any plausible government intention will 
1. How purpose is discerned: three possibilities 
The Supreme Court case of United States Railroad Retire- 
ment Board u. ~ r i t z ~ ~  is particularly enlightening in the area 
of purpose and rational basis scrutiny. I t  outlines three of the 
more prominent views on this question. 
The first view, espoused by Justice Brennan, is that a 
statute or administrative practice must be rationally related to 
the actual, stated purpose of the law maker.49 According to 
Justice Brewan, such purpose can often be discerned by pe- 
rusing legislative history.50 Under this approach, a judicially- 
imagined purpose would never be sufficient to meet the re- 
quirements of rational basis scrutiny if another purpose had 
been articulated by the law maker, as in Allegheny Pittsburgh. 
This view results in the least deferential rational basis scmti- 
46. See Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at  2336 (Thomas, J., concurring in part); 
Glennon, supra note 9, a t  268. 
47. For a discussion on legitimacy of purposes, see Melanie E. Meyers, Note, 
Impermissible Purposes and The Equal Protection Clause, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1184 
(1986). 
48. 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (Equal Protection Clause challenge to the Railroad 
Retirement Act of 1974). 
49. See Id. at  184 ( B r e ~ a n ,  J., dissenting); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 
361, 374-75 (1974); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1970); F.S. Royster Guano 
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). For cases implementing Justice 
B r e ~ a n ' s  view, see Zobel v. Williams, 457 US. 55, 61-63 (1982); United States 
Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 (1973). 
50. See Fritz, 449 U.S. a t  185-87 ( B r e ~ a n ,  J., dissenting) (pointing to legisla- 
tive reports as the proper means of discerning purpose). 
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ny. Moreover, this approach is arguably impossible to apply 
when the law maker is the voting public; such was the case 
with Proposition 13, which was passed by initiative. 
A second view, or middle ground, finds support from Jus- 
tice Stevens in his concurring opinion in Fritzs1 In addition to 
an actual, articulated purpose of a legislature, the Court may 
also look to legitimate, unstated purposes that the legislature 
may have ~onsidered.'~ This approach is effective \when the 
actual purpose of a statute is ambiguous. 
A third, and most deferential, view has been espoused by 
Justice Rehnquist. This approach asserts than any legitimate 
and plausible purpose which is rationally effected by a given 
classification is sufficient to make that classification a consti- 
tutional one, regardless of whether the legislature articulated 
or even considered the purpose.53 In areas of Equal Protection 
Clause jurisprudence where special deference is expected, and 
especially in taxation cases where a presumption of constitu- 
tionality exists, Justice Rehnquist's approach seems the most 
appropriate way to effect such license.54 
51. See Fritz, 449 U.S. at 180-81 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
52. Justice Stevens contrasts his view with that of Justice Brennan in Fritz. 
I do not . . . share Justice Breman's conclusion that every statutory 
classification must further an objective that can be confidently identified 
as the "actual purpose" of the legislature. Actual purpose is sometimes 
unknown. Moreover, undue emphasis on actual motivation may result in 
identically worded statutes being held valid in one State and invalid in a 
neighboring State. I therefore believe that we must discover a correlation 
between the classification and either the actual purpose of the statute or 
a legitimate purpose that we may reasonably presume to have motivated 
an impartial legislature. 
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
53. In Fritz, Justice Rehnquist said, Where, as  here, there are plausible rea- 
sons for Congress' action, our inquiry is at an end. It is, of course, 'constitutionally 
irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision,' because 
this Court has never insisted that a legislative body articulate its reasons for en- 
acting a statute." Id. at 179 (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 
(1960)). For support of this view, see McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 
US. 802, 809 (1969) ("Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally 
even if source materials normally resorted to for ascertaining their grounds for 
action are otherwise silent, and their statutory classifications will be set aside only 
if no grounds can be conceived to justify them.") (citations omitted); Allied Stores, 
Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528-30 (1959) (requiring "any state of fads" con- 
ceivable to sustain a rational basis of a classification); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 
U.S. 83, 88 (1940) ("The burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrange- 
ment to negative every conceivable basis which might support it."). 
54. Compare this approach with Justice Breman's dissent in Fritz: "[Tlhe ra- 
tional-basis standard 'is not a toothless one,' and will not be satisfied by flimsy or 
implausible justifications for the legislative classification, proffered after the fact by 
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2. How the Nordlinger Court arrived a t  purpose 
In  Nordlinger, once it was decided that rational basis scru- 
tiny was merited, the opinion quickly turned to identifying the 
rational effects of California's classification, naming neighbor- 
hood preservation and respect for reliance interests as reasons 
for passing Proposition 13. Said Justice Blackmun, "Article 
XIIIA was enacted precisely to achieve the benefits of an acqui- 
sition-value system."55 Unfortunately, the goal of an initiative 
such as Proposition 13 cannot be determined with precision. As 
one commentator remarked shortly after the initiative's pas- 
sage, "I don't think anyone really understands the implications 
of Proposition 13. I don't think we understand why it passed or 
what the results are going to be."56 Unlike most statutory 
laws, initiatives have no legislative hearings from which to 
discern the purpose because the citizenry, with its inherent 
diversity of reasoning, acts as the lawmaker. 
The forefront of the debate between proponents and oppo- 
nents of Proposition 13 did not center on the benefits and lia- 
bilities of market-value or acquisition-value taxation. Voters 
had numerous reasons for overhauling the state's tax structure; 
but, according to one public opinion poll, the most common 
"purposes" of Proposition 13 were (1) to reduce excessive taxes, 
and (2) to cut government costs, waste, and ineffi~iency.~' Vot- 
ers wishing to cut their property taxes had reason to vote fgr 
Government attorneys." 449 U.S. at 184 ( B r e ~ a n ,  J., dissenting) (quoting Mathews 
v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)). In Fritz, Justice Rehnquist applied a deferen- 
tial standard, searching beyond the "actual purpose" of the legislation to find other 
legitimate purposes effected by its terms. In his dissent Justice B r e ~ a n  stated, "I 
suggest that the mode of analysis employed by the Court in this case virtually 
immunizes social and economic legislative classifications from judicial review." Id. 
at  183. 
55. 112 S. Ct. at 2335. 
56. Thomas Fletcher, Anticipation and Uncertainty, in PROPOSITION 13 AND 
ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 49, 49 (Selma J. Mushkin ed., 1979). 
57. See Mervin Field, Sending a Message: Californians Strike Back, PUB. 
OPINION, July-Aug. 1978, at 3, 5 (reporting the results of a public opinion poll 
taken weeks a h r  the passing of Proposition 13). Opponents of Proposition 13 did 
not focus their attention on the inequities of disparate tax burdens for similarly 
situated property owners, as Ms. Nordlinger complained about. Instead, Proposition 
13 was seen as a measure which would bankrupt the state government. See, e.g., 
ALVIN RABUSHKA & PAULINE RYAN, THE TAX REVOLT (1982); DAVID 0. SEARS & 
JACK CITRIN, TAX REVOLT: SOMETHING FOR NOTHING IN CALIFORNIA (1985);  PO- 
SITION 13 AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR PUBLIC MANAGEMENT (Selma J. Mushkin 
ed., 1979). 
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Proposition 13 regardless of whether market-value or acquisi- 
tion-value assessing resulted. The tax rate would have dropped 
dramatically either way. 
Contrary to Justice Blackmun's claim, the Nordlinger 
Court could not have determined an "actual purpose" because 
no single purpose existed. Rather, the Court selected from 
among the numerous rational effects of the "tax revolt." 
3. The problematic arrival at purpose in Allegheny Pittsburgh 
In contrast to Nordlinger, the Allegheny Pittsburgh Court 
would accept no other purpose than that stated by the Asses- 
sor-to tax properties based on their current market value. 
Having narrowed the field of legitimate purposes to one, the 
Court asked if the taxing scheme was rationally related to  
achieving market-value taxation. Predictably, the Court found 
that the assessment scheme was a plainly irrational means to  
accomplish the stated end because the county's occasional up- 
ward adjustments to property values would require nearly five 
hundred years to bring assessed value and market value in 
line? Such analysis clashed with traditionally deferential 
property tax adjudication and produced a result that had not 
been witnessed for several decades5' 
Given the appropriate deference to the states in fashioning 
their own tax schemes, the Court has customarily been more 
than willing to exercise judicial imagination to  arrive at a plau- 
sible purpose.60 In Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, the Court 
stated that "a classification, though discriminatory, is not arbi- 
trary nor violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four- 
teenth Amendment if any state of facts reasonably can be con- 
ceived that would sustain it."' In outlining the Equal Pro- 
tection Clause in Nordlinger, Justice Blackmun merely requires 
a "plausible policy reason for the cla~sification."~~ The Alleghe- 
ny Pittsburgh decision itself stated that only " 'some reasonable 
consideration of difference or policy' " was required." Never- 
58. Allegheny Pittsburgh, 488 U.S. at 341-42. 
59. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
60. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); 
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (exploring reasons why the 
legislature might have passed a statute). 
61. 358 U.S. 522, 528-29 (1959). 
62. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2332 (emphasis added). 
63. 488 U.S. at 344 (quoting Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563, 
573 (1910)). 
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theless, the Allegheny Pittsburgh Court was unwilling to 
stretch its judicial imagination past the purpose offered by the 
County's counsel. 
A number of plausible reasons exist for assessing proper- 
ties based on acquisition value in Webster County, just as they 
exist in Los Angeles County. The expense of assessing coal 
bearing lands, which involves extensive core drilling and Sam- 
pling, was a substantial economic barrier to assessing the val- 
ues of land in Webster C~unty . '~  The value of a parcel could 
be more easily determined by reference to a purchase price. 
Furthermore, neighborhood preservation and protection of 
reliance interests are as important in Webster County as in  
California. Had the Supreme Court followed traditional ratio- 
nal basis scrutiny and applied its reasonable imagination to 
discern a plausible policy reason, the county's property tax 
program would have, been equally as constitutional as 
California's. 
Perhaps poor advocacy in Allegheny Pittsburgh caused the 
Court to rule the way it did.65 If no purpose need be articulat- 
ed,'' only a "plausible" purpose need exist to uphold a classifi- 
cation. Counsel for Webster County would have been better off 
letting the Court search for that "plausibley' purpose rather 
than articulating a goal that the assessor's actions could not 
possibly accomplish. 
The pragmatic reasons for determining purpose through 
judicial imagination in rational basis scrutiny are com- 
pelling? A room full of legislators can hardly be expected to 
64. See G l e ~ o n ,  supra note 9, at  271 n.55. 
65. Id. at 272-75. 
66. "To be sure, the Equal Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of 
rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articu- 
late a t  any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification." Nordlinger, 
112 S. Ct. at 2334. 
67. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & 
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 216 (1983) ("[Ilnquiry into legislative motive is often 
an unsatisfactory venture."). Cf. Gerald Gunther, Supreme Court, 1971 T e n ,  Fore- 
word: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer 
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). Professor Gunther asserts that judi- 
cial imagination of legislative purpose results in essentially no scrutiny a t  all and 
believes that purpose should be based in actuality. 
Putting consistent new bite into the old equal protection would mean that 
the Court would be less willing to supply justifying rationales by exercis- 
ing its imagination. I t  would have the Court assess the means in terms 
of legislative purposes that have substantial basis in actuality, not merely 
in conjecture. Moreover, it would have the Justices gauge the reasonable- 
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articulate one collective purpose for a statute, nor can a county 
commission, and certainly not a body of voters passing an ini- 
tiative such as Proposition 13. Indeed, few lawmakers would 
assert that one "actual" purpose was behind their plan. If, 
however, a law maker were able to purport just one goal, 
should a court assume the stated goal is not collateral to other 
ambitions legislators or state actors may be pursuing? 
Ascertaining the "actual" purpose, if it exists, is a difficult 
feat in itself. Should judges peruse reports of legislative hear- 
ings, review minutes of county meetings, or poll voters to as- 
certain actual purpose or should they accept that  purpose en- 
unciated by a clever counsel? Arguably, by exercising judicial 
imagination while looking a t  the plain effects of a scheme, a 
court is more likely to discern the primary goal of a statute or 
administrative procedure. 
Practically indistinguishable governmental practices be- 
come subject to miscellaneous rules and standards if a court is 
bent on ascertaining the "actual" purpose of each practice. The 
Allegheny Pittsburgh Court maintained that the Constitution 
requires "the seasonable attainment of a rough equality in tax 
treatment of similarly situated property owners."68 But the 
majority in Nordlinger required no such equality, apparently 
limiting this requirement's application to governments that 
articulate a specific purpose-that of creating current-market- 
value taxation. That the Court in Allegheny Pittsburgh intend- 
ed no such limitation seems clear from its manifesto: 
"[Ilntentional systematic undervaluation by state officials of 
other taxable property in the same class contravenes the con- 
stitutional right of one taxed upon the full value of his prop- 
e r t~ ."~ '  The Allegheny Pittsburgh opinion gave every indica- 
tion that the gross disparity in  tax liability was unconstitution- 
ally discriminatory regardless of the system of taxation an as- 
sessor utilized. 
As it stands today, a law maker questioning whether an 
anticipated practice will pass rational basis scrutiny is left with 
little guidance. Rather than reviewing the results of similar 
ness of questionable means on the basis of materials that are offered to 
the Court, rather than resorting to rationalizations created by perfunctory 
judicial hypothesizing. 
Id. at 21. 
68. Allegheny Pittsburgh, 488 U.S. at 343. 
69. Id. at 345 (quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 
352-353 (1918)). 
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schemes in  other jurisdictions, the law maker might question 
whether a court will find an articulated purpose of the practice 
hidden in legislative histories or in minutes of county assessor 
meetings. On the other hand, the law maker should also query 
whether the court will summarily concoct a purpose as the 
Supreme Court did with Proposition 13. 
C. Other Factors That May Have Influenced the Decision 
Legal scholars might justifiably view an inquiry into the 
purpose of a statute or scheme with a degree of cynicism, con- 
sidering the anything but uniform way it has been handled.?' 
The application of purpose is often outcome determinative; 
hence, it often appears that the desired outcome determines 
how purpose is to be discerned. 
There are several possible factors unrelated to the purpose 
of the taxation strategies in Nordlinger and Allegheny Pitts- 
burgh that may have influenced the Court's decisions. First, 
codified schemes have an  aura of rationality and respectability 
that is not found in those schemes designed by a county asses- 
sor and which conflict with the state's constitution. Second, a 
scheme passed with an overwhelming approval of the voters of 
the most populous state in the Union is more difficult to over- 
turn than that designed by an assessor of a small, rural county. 
Proposition 13 is a direct product of the democratic process 
Americans hold close to their harts. 
Another possible reason for the Court's decision, from a 
political perspective, is the difference in the practical effect of 
overturning the California Constitution versus the acts of the 
Webster County assessor. The Court may have been hesitant to 
render a decision that might have bankrupted a large and pow- 
e r N  state.?' In Allegheny Pittsburgh, however, the decision 
against the small, rural county went largely unnoticed outside 
the affected geographic and legal perimeter. 
70. Justice Rehnquist has noted the Court's haphazard treatment in this. area. 
See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 US. 166, 174 (1980) ("Despite 
the narrowness of the issue, this Court in earlier cases has not been altogether 
consistent in its pronouncements in this area."); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 
777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe Court's decisions can fairly be de- 
scribed as an endless tinkering with legislative judgments, a series of conclusions 
unsupported by any central guiding principal."). 
71. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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The Court's decision in Allegheny Pittsburgh left Equal 
Protection Clause jurisprudence, as it pertains to taxation, in a 
state of disarray. The decision not only overturned a property 
tax scheme for the first time in almost fifty years, but also 
imposed a stringent "rough equality" requirement upon prop- 
erty tax assessments. Nordlinger v. Hahn gave the Court an 
opportunity to either affirm the Allegheny Pittsburgh changes 
or return to taxation schemes the traditional deference they 
had once enjoyed. 
The Nordlinger Court applied traditional rational basis 
scrutiny to California's taxation plan; but, in order to do so 
without reversing Allegheny Pittsburgh, the Court made Alle- 
gheny Pittsburgh's constitutional requirement of "rough equali- 
ty" in taxation contingent upon the "actual purpose" of the 
taxation strategy employed.72 As a result, the stated purpose 
of a legislative or administrative action now appears to be more 
determinative of whether rational basis scrutiny is met than 
the host of factors normally inquired into.73 
In effect, using "actual purpose" in rational basis scrutiny 
creates multiple standards that depend on the courts' ability to 
discern the underlying purpose of a government action. The 
Allegheny Pittsburgh Court could easily discern an actual, stat- 
ed purpose since the law maker was an individual, the county 
assessor, who stated the goal of her actions. The result of nar- 
rowing in on that purpose to the exclusion of other plausible 
purposes was anything but deferential rational basis scrutiny. 
In contrast, the Nordlinger Court claimed to have found the 
precise purpose of Proposition 13 where no single purpose 
72. It appears Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, was correct in stat- 
ing, "Allegheny Pittsburgh appears to have survived today's decision. I wonder, 
though, about its legacy." Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at  2341 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
73. Justice Stevens once outlined a number of factors which should typically 
be considered. 
In every equal protection case, we have to ask certain basic questions. 
What class is harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a 
"tradition of disfavor" by our laws? What is the public purpose that is be- 
ing .served by the law? What is the characteristic of the disadvantaged 
class that justifies the disparate treatment? In most cases the answer to 
these questions will tell us whether the statute has a "rational basis." 
City of Cleburne v: Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 453 (1985) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part) (footnotes omitted). 
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existed. In  actuality, the Court had a cornucopia of plausible 
purposes from which i t  could, and did, select-some happened 
to match the consequences of the initiative. The result was 
traditional deferential rational basis scrutiny. After Nordlinger, 
counsel for the government would be wise to avoid alleging that 
an actual, primary purpose exists; the Court may be more like- 
ly to exercise judicial imagination and find a legitimate purpose 
effected by the scheme. 
Michael D. Rawlins 
